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The Expansion of Federal Influence
T
HE passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 marked the end
of a period in which it was considered that the requirements
of real estate finance (and partidilarly of farm finance) could be
attained by general banking and currency reform. In spite of a
number of concessions to the agrarian interest,' the Federal Re-
serve Board was hardly established when there were demands for
special credit facilities to assure lower interest rates and a more
ample supply of credit for farmers.
The main pressure for creating new financing institutions con-
centrated on the federal government, although a few states under-
took similar experiments. For instance, during and soon after
World War I, Minnesota and South Dakota established specialized
institutions—wholly capitalized and wholly owned by their govern-
ments—for making farm loans.2 These, however, were quite apart
from the main current. They set no precedent, and they rapidly
sank into the background with the growth of a new federal system.
FEDERAL LAND BANK SYSTEM
Several years of official study and discussion resulted in the passage
of the Farm Loan Act in and the establishment of the Fed-
eral Land Bank System. The original characteristics of the System
are well described by Sparks:"These new land banks were a dis-
tinct departure from earlier land bank schemes in this country.
They are entirely divorced from commercial banking and currency
schemes, and are purely investment banks, attracting loaning funds
1 Such as the elimination of banker representation on the Federal Reserve Board,
the provision that all notes of issue be governmental obligations, and the favored
status given to farm paper.
2 Earl S. Sparks, History and Theory of Agricultural Credit in the United States
(New York, 1932) Chapter 15. In addition to these institutions, many state endow-
ment and pension funds were permitted, or directed, to lend money on the security
of real estate mortgages (ibid., Chapter 14).
3 39 Stat. 360 (1916); 12 U.S.C. 641.
4S. Sparks, op. cit., p. 115.
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by the sale of bonds based on first mortgages and loaning only on
first mortgages."
The new Land Bank System also differed significantly from the
contemporary state land banks in that it was designed to be private
in so far as sources of funds and managerial policies were con-
cerned. The governmental function, in the initial concept, was
limited to aid in organization, temporary financial support, and
general supervision. This original concept was later modified be-
cause of failure to obtain sufficient capital from private sources to
permit early withdrawal of government support and because of
the unexpectedly prolonged farm depression following World War
I, which brought demands for new functions and policies that ap-
peared to be incompatible with private investment. Nevertheless,
the cautious nature of the first interventionary step of the federal
government and the prolonged discussion that preceded it are espe-
cially striking in view of the successively more drastic measures
which were later adopted with progressively decreasing opposition.
The Land Bank System, as first organized, was placed under the
jurisdiction of the Treasury and made subject to the immediate
supervision of a Farm L.oan Board. The Board included the Secre-
tary of the Treasury and four members (later six) appointed by
the President, one of whom was designated executive officer of the
Board with the title of Farm Loan Commissioner (later Land Bank
Commissioner). Salaries and expenses of the Board and of farm
loan registrars (one for each land bank) were paid by the federal
government. Subsequent reorganization (1933) placed the System
in an independent agency, the Farm Credit Administration, and
substituted for the Board a single administrative officer with title
of Governor. In 1939 the Farm Credit Administration, including
the Land Bank System, was transferred to the Department of
Agriculture.5
From the start, the System has consisted of twelve regional fed-
eral land banks. The banks were authorized to obtain funds by
issuing stocks and bonds (the bonds were exempt from federal
and state income taxes until 1941) and to make first mortgage loans
to local cooperative borrower organizations known as national
5DonaldC. Horton, Harold C. Larsen and Norman J. Wall, Farm Mortgage
Credit Facilities in the United States, Department of Agriculture, Misc. Pub. 478
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farm loan associations, or to farmers directly or through authorized
agents in areas where no such privately capitalized association had
been chartered. Originally, land bank loans were required to be
for land purchase or productive purposes. Later, as credit became
more stringent during the depression of the 1930's, the range of
eligibility was broadened to include loans for refunding debt and
even for current expenses.6
As evidence of the original emphasis onprivate character of
the System, six of the nine directors of each of the land banks were
to be chosen by the local farm loan associations, the others being
appointed by the Loan Board, the governing body of the
System. A change in attitude toward a more dominant govern-
mental. influence occurred in 1923 when the number of locally
selected directors was reduced to three and, of the seven-man Board,
four were named by the Farm Loan Board.7 The abolition of the
Board in 1933 with the substitution of a single governor and the
subordination of the governor to the Secretary of Agriculture in
1939 carried the concentration of government influence still
further.
When the Land Bank System was created, the Secretary of the
Treasury was required to subscribe to all capital stock in the re-
gional banks not taken up by the public within thirty days. Since
littl.e public subscription was made, the great bulk of the banks'
initial capital represented governmental rather than private invest-
ment. There was a gradual but continuous increase in the amount
of stock subscribed by the member institutions of the System until,
by the end of 1931, the federal stock investment had been almost
retired and nearly all the federal land bank stock was held by
national farm loan associations and direct borrowers. During the
depression of the thirties, however, there was a new infusion of
federal funds. In 1940, as recovery came, the Treasury holding had
been reduced from its peak of $125 million to a little over $67
million; but, by 1943, in order to assist the wartime expansion of
6 Ibid., pp. 79, 83-85. The direct loan provisions were not much used. The land
banks were also authorized to charter and supervise joint stock land banks, privately
capitalized farm mortgage institutions authorized to issue tax-exempt bonds at a
ratio to capital and surplus of 15 to1. The joint stock land banks operated for
seventeen years, until their liquidation was brought about by the Emergency Farm
Loan Act of (ibid., Chapter 8).
7 Ibid., pp. 70-71.90 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT•
agriculture, the government again increased its inVestment to $120
During the high farm-yield years of World War II, reduc-
tion was again resumed, and by the middle of 1947 the last of the
federal capital was retired.9
In to the government support rendered by direct cap-
italization, the Secretary of the Treasury was also authorized to
subscribe to the paid-in surplus and to buy the bonds of the banks,
thus leaving no phase of the financial operation without govern-
mental participation. Because, at the outset, questions of constitu-
tionality discouraged the purchase of the land bank issues by the
public, the Treasury was authorized to purchase the bonds during
the years 1918 and 1919 and subsequently also during 1920 and
.1921 up to a total of $200 million. Although the doubt was re-
solved in favor of the land banks in 192 1,10 the Treasury continued
to be a substantial holder of land bank bonds through the early
1920's and did not liquidate its holdings until 1926. Land bank
bonds were also made eligible for purchase by the Federal Reserve
banks, which have acquired them only on a few occasions and held
them only for short periods of time. In addition, short-term loans
to the land banks have also been made by the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation. Subscriptions by the Treasury to paid-in sur-
plus of land banks (authorized in1931) represented another
substantial form of support, amounting as late as 1943 to more than
$142 million.11
The retirement in 1947 of the federal capital and paid-in sur-
plus put the Land Bank System—so far as its ownership was con-
cerned—in a position comparable to the Federal Reserve System.
In spite of this withdrawal—unique in the annals of federal inter-
vention—the continued power to appoint all land bank officials
combined with the general authority of the Secretary of Agricul-
ture over the Farm Credit Administration left the Land Bank
System completely under governmental influence.12
8 Statistical of the United States, 1944-45, p. 374.
9 The Fourteenth Annual Report of the Farm Credit Administration, 1946.47.
10 Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), based on Section
8 of the Constitution. See Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means
Today (Princeton, 1940) pp. 29-30.
11 D. C. Horton, et a!., op. cit., pp. 79-80, and 82. In June 1947, the Treasury was
reimbursed for the last of its outstanding contribution to paid-in surplus (Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 1948, p. 449).
12 The Hope Bill of 1947 would again have modified the organization by placingEXPANSION OF FEDERAL INFLUENCE 91
The significant feature in the Land Bank System was the direct
use for the first time of federal funds for capital and paid-in surplus.
The early provision for Treasury purchases of the land bank bonds
was also significant, since it temporarily gave the System a quasi-
central banking support rather similar in effect, if not in form, to
the facilities given to commercial banking through the Federal
Reserve System,'3 and led the way to other kinds of public support
in later emergencies.
BEGINNING OF INTERVENTION IN URBAN REALTY
FINANCE—THE HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM
Widespread public problem was
first about, following World War I, byhigh. costs, high.
rents, and tightcredit. The state of New York at that time made its
first experiments with tax t.o
building activity. Wisconsin enabled municipalities to lend funds
to housing corporations. The North Dakota legislature empowered
the state to engage in home building. California. made state funds
available for home loans to veterans.'4 Suggestions for modifica-
tions of the federal income tax on mortgage interest and profits on
home-building operations were offered.15 In the main, however,
the approach to the problem was through the credit system.
th€i of the Land
NeW York (later changed to the Savings and
Loan Bank of the State of New York).'° Tclareser-
voir of credit, created by, and available to, loan
associations ofe state. During the period between World War I
and the depression, institutions of a somewhat similar character
were established in other states, notably California, Florida, Massa-
chusetts, and Ohio.'7
the System under an Agricultural Credit Agency, separate from the Department of
Agriculture and directed by a seven-man Agricultural Credit Board; but this measure
(H.R. 1677, 80th Congress) was not passed.
13 See Donald C. Horton, Interwar Credit Aids Associated with Farm Ownership
and Operation, Department of Agriculture (Washington, mimeographed, 1945) p. 17.
14 Housing Problems in America, Proceedings of the Eighth National Conference
on Housing, 1920, pp. 323-24.
15 For instance, S. 2094, 66th Congress.
16 History of Building and Loan in the United States, Morton Bodflsh, ed. (U. S.
Building and Loan League, Chicago, 1931) p. 506.
17 Report of the Liquidity Committee of the New Jersey Building and Loan
League, 1931.92 IMPACTOF GOVERNMENT
Pressures created by the post-World War I housing problem
soon made themselves felt on Congress. In this connection it should
be noted that, despite the wartime experience of the federal gov-
ernment with government-owned housing, no serious effort was
made to maintain this type of activity. In fact the liquidation of its
housing, which was ordered immediately after the war, indicated
the desire of the government to divest itself of this responsibility.'8
When the pressure for aid was reasserted, it was in the form of
demands for improved credit facilities rather than for direct action
in the field of construction.
The first of these proposals called for the discount of home
mortgages by the Federal Reserve banks and for the expansion of
the Land Bank System to cover urban as well as farm mortgages,
but it met with successful opposition.19 During the 1920's and early
1930's, bills were repeatedly introduced in Congress calling for the
establishment of a central mortgage bank, with power of loan and
discount,2° but support for these proposals was not widespread. The
less ambitious home loan bank plan took precedence and, in the
subsequent wave of depression legislation, the idea of a central
mortgage bank quietly succumbed.
The earliest cJ.iscwsi.ors of credit sys-
a year later by the introduc-
tion of the first bills on the subject.2' However, interest in federal
action waned as the postwar expansion developed and was not
revived until after 1928 when serious weaknesses in the mortgage
situation had begun to appear. Foijowing a widely publicized Con-
ference on Home Building ome'Ownershipcalled by Presi-
dent a bill to Home Loan Bank
System was introducc4 and, speeded by the already apparent realty
collapse, was passed in 1932.22 The. System was established in the
same ye4r.
18 See Miles L. Colean, Housing for Defense (The Twentieth Century Fund, New
York, 1940) Chapter 1.
19 M. Bodfish, op. cit., pp. 207 if.
20 For instance, H.R. 10518, 66th Congress; HR. 8049, 68th Congress; S. 4310, 68th
Congress; S. 3013, 70th Congress.
21 S. 1469, S. 2492, HR. 6371, H.R. 7597, all 66th Congress.
22 Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 47 Stat. 725 (1932); 12 U.S.C. 1421 et. seq. The
Conference had other less immediate, but in many ways more far-reaching, effects
than the passage of the Home Loan Bank Act. The beginning of the present wide-
spread public interest in slum clearance, public housing, limited dividend and co-EXPANSION OF FEDERAL INFLUENCE 93
Thenew System followed the pattern of the Federal Reserve
System and the original Federal Land Bank System in that it had
a central governing board appointed by the President and a group
of regional banks. These
tomakejoan& to_member institutions, whick mighLlap.y:state-
chartered institution (savings and loan association, savings bank,
or insurance company) engaged in mortgages on houses
and small buildings.23
As in the case of the land banks, Treasury stock subscriptions
were used in launching the System, with the great bulk of initial
capital coming from this source. En spite of the introduction of
numerous bills for the purpose, however, the Treasury, through
1949, had not been authorized to purchase home loan bank bonds,
as it had with respect to land bank bonds. Nor were any federal
contributions made to the paid-in surplus of the home loan banks.
Notwithstanding these differences, the Home Loan Bank System
has continued to be strongly influenced by the federal government
in administration and financing.24
IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
Neither the Federal Land Bank System nor the Federal
Loan Bank System was able to cope effectually with the flood
Foreclosures that swept overnation in the early thirties. Far-
reaching governniental action was taken, and the next decade and
a half saw developments that completely altered the relationships
between government and the public, government and lending in-
stitutions, and lending institutions and the public.
The developments were almost wholly federal in character, al-
operative housing companies, "large-scale" housing operations, neighborhood plan-
ning, and housing for minority groups, may be traced to the reports of Conference
committees. These reports were published in eleven volumes under the title Presi-
dent's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership (Washington, 1931).
23 Membership has been almost wholly confined to state- or federally-chartered
savings and loan associations.
24 According to the Statistical Summary, 1919, issued by the Home Loan Bank
Board in May 1949, government stock in the home loan banks at the end of 1948
amounted, for the first time, to less than half the total (49.7 percent). The actions
of the Home Loan Bank Commissioner in 1945 in disapproving the election of the
President of the Los Angeles Bank and the forced merger of the Los Angeles and
l'ortland Banks, whatever the merits of the cases, indicate the extent of the power
claimed and exercised by the federal authority. (See U. S. Congress. House. Hearings
Before the Select Committee to Investigate Acts of Executive Agencies Which Exceed
Their Authority, Washington, 1947, 79th Congress, 2nd sess., June 12-14, 1946.)94 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
there was state legislation designed to relieve mortgage
While these state relief measures were often more drastic
l.than in earlier years, the pattern was not substantially changed.
The effect of state action was, at best, only temporarily and par-
daily alleviative; its deeper import was negative and aggravating,
for the balance of the law, now so strongly tipped in the debtor's
favor, threatened to block recovery.
In this situation, the federal government's initial measures were
designed to make foreclosure unnecessary by refinancing delin-
quent mortgage loans on farm and home property. Under the
Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 26(andlater amendments
to the Federal Farm Loan Act), the rate of interest on land bank
loans was successively reduced, reaching a minimum of 3.5 percent
between July 1, 1940 and July 1, 1944, with the Treasury paying
to the land banks the difference between the rate so established
and the contract rate—the first appearance of outright subsidy in
a federal credit mechanism.27 The Emergency Farm Mortgage Act
also permitted a five-year moratorium after March 4, 1933 on
principal payments on the outstanding land bank loans if the
borrower was not in default on any other covenant of the mort-
gage. The interest subsidies were not ended until 1942.28
Under the same act, the Land Bank Commissioner, from a $200
million fund made available by the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration, was empowered to make farm mortgage loans not to
exceed $7,500 but up to 75 percent of value (as against 50 percent
for the land banks) to refinance indebtedness, provide working
capital, and redeem foreclosed property. An additional $100 mil-
lion was made available to the Commissioner for loans to joint
stock land banks of which one-fourth was reserved for facilitating
a two-year postponement of foreclosure of delinquent loans.29
This activity was superseded by the Federal Farm Mortgage
Corporation (created by the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation
25SeeChapter 3.
2648 Stat. 48 (1933); 12 U.S.C. 1016.
27Frommid-1944 to mid-1945 the maximum interest rate to farmer-borrowers
was set at 4 percent and, tliereafter, at 1 percent more than the interest rate on land
bank loans to national farm loan associations.
28D.C. Horton, et al., cit., p.86. A deferment of principal payments on new
loans was later authorized for the first three years of the loan.
29Ibid..,pp. 109.10.EXPANSION OF FEDERAL INFLUENCE 95
Act of 1934)to which the funds of the Land Bank Commissioner
were transferred to provide the capital stock of the Corporation.
In addition to the authority inherited from the Land Bank Com-
missioner, the Corporation was empowered to assist in financing
the land banks through an exchange of bonds. It was authorized
to issue $2 billion in bonds, fully guaranteed as to principal and
interest. The same interest subsidies were made available to loans
of the Land Bank Commissioner and the Federal Farm Mortgage
Corporation as were provided for land bank loans.3'
The actionstaken inconnection with farm credit were paral-
leled in the fld firban mortgage finance. In 1933 thçHorpe
OwnerscQrporation (wholly
ernment) was establithe4 under the
Bank Board.32
This, the second credit institution to be wholly owned and
wholly operated by the federal government, was granted a capital-
ization of $200 million and an ultimate loan authorization of $4.75
billion to be used for taking over and refinancing mortgages on
one- to four-family dwellings that were either delinquent or held
in frozen lending The debentures of the Corpora-
tion were given a Treasury guarantee first for interest and later
(when the bonds could not be sold at par) for principal also.
The RFC Mortgage Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of
the Reconstruction Finance corporation, was organized to assist
in refunding defaulted mortgages on urban commercial property
and, as a bank of last resort, to make new loans on such property.
Later, this institution was used to provide support for various
other federal mortgage financing activities such as the mortgage
insurance of the Federal Housing Administration and the loan
guarantees of the Veterans' Administration, by providing a market
for mortgage loans made under the auspices of these agencies.34
80 48 Stat. 344 (1934); 12 U.S.C. 1020. See D. C. Horton, et al., op. cit., Chapter 7,
for description of the organization and activity of the Federal Farm Mortgage
Corporation.
81 Ibid., pp. 110-12.
32 The Home Owners' Loan Act, 48 Stat. 128 (1933); 12 U.S.C. 1461 et seq.
33 Ultimately $3.49 billion of the authorization was used. The HOLC stopped
making new loans in June 1936, a1though lending for repair and refinancing contin-
ued. By December 81, 1948, outstanding loans had been reduced to $369 million, and
only twenty foreclosed properties were still in the hands of the Corporation.
84 The RFC Mortgage Company was liquidated under 1947 amendments to the
RFC Act; 61 Stat. 202 (1947).96 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
While these operations were getting under way, the govern-
ment was already concerning itself with other means of reopen-
ing and widening the channels of mortgage credit. Adapting the
safety-fund device, which had a long history in New York and
Massachusetts, Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, designed to insure depositors in state and national
banks that became members of the Corporation against loss up to
The federal government subscribed to somewhat more
thanpercent of the capital stock of the Corporation, the re-
mainder being taken by the Federal Reserve banks, and the bonds
of the Corporation were made purchasable by the RFC and the
Treasury. Insurance premiums were set at a level expected to cover
operating expenses and claims. Close on the heels of the FDIC
came a similarly constituted institution for savings and loan asso-
ciations—the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 36
—with a $100 million capitalization wholly subscribed by the
HOLC. In this case, bonds that might be issued by the Corpora-
tion were neither guaranteed nor purchasable by the Treasury.37
Both of these institutions played important parts in restoring
public confidence in commercial banks and savings and loan asso-
ciations and, indirectly, in overcoming the paralysis of the mort-
gage market. They reduced, although they could not altogether
stop, the withdrawal of funds caused by fear and panic rather than
cash needs. Through these means, they minimized further liquida-
tion of mortgage loans and paved the way for a resumption of
lending activity.
More direct methods, however, were considered necessary to
encourage building and to increase the supply of funds for new.
lending. One means to this end, the recapitalization of the land
banks, has already been mentioned. The act that established the
HOLC also provided for the chartering of federal savings and loan
35 The FDIC was created subject to the provisions of the Banking Act of 1933,
48 Stat. 168 and subsequent amendments, 12 U.S.C. 264.
36 Created by Title IV of the National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934).
37 It may be noted that, although in both instances the federal investment was
assumed to be temporary, dividends were not paid on the Treasury or HOLC stock
until 1947 nor were any plans for the retirement of the government stock seriously
considered.. In 1947, an act of Congress (61 Stat. 773) provided for the cancellation of
the capital stock of the FDIC. A bill providing for gradual retirement of the capital
stock of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation was adopted by the
House but died in the Senate. During 1949 no further action was taken.EXPANSION OF FEDERAL INFLUENCE 97
associationsin order to create new mortgage lending facilities for
underserviced areas. Provision was also made for federalizing insti-
tutions already organized under state charter. The Treasury was
authorized to subscribe up to 50 percent of the shares in any one
federal association, with a total actual investment of $50 million.
In 1935 the HOLC was authorized to purchase shares in federal
associations or state associations that were members of the Federal
Home Loan Bank System or of the FSLIC. The total share sub-
scription by the Treasury and the HOLC came to a little over $261
million.38
Up to this point the Home Loan Bank Board had been
main focus for measures to stimulate nonfarm home finance.
home loan banks were subject to its supervision; and the
and examination of federal associations were in its jurisdictionj
The members of the Board served also as directors of the
and of the FSLIC. The National Housing Act of 1934,
created a separate independent agency, the Federal Housing Ad-h
ministration, to give an impetus to new lending. This was to
accomplished by insuring private lending institutions against
that might be incurred in connection with unsecured loans for re-c
pairs to real property and first mortgage loans on one- to
family dwellings and larger rental housing properties.39
The repair loan plan was at first considered to be wholly for the
emergency, with all expenses and claims paid directly by the gov-
ernment. As time went on, however, the original stimulative pur-
pose of the plan was forgotten, and the repair loan insurance
became in effect a permanent activity. of. the
was, however, the
Mortgage guarantee companies had
flourished briefly and collapsed spectacularly in the years just past.
But many features of were new.
tion and
that involved the provision of initial insurance funds, payment of
operating expenses in whole or in part for a five-year period, full
38Ofthe total amount of $261 million in Treasury and HOLC shares in insured
institutions at the peak in 1938, only $6,093,000 (or 2.3 percent) remained outstanding
as of December 31, 1947, according to the Home Loan Bank Board, Statistical Sum-
mary, 1919, Table 6.
3948 Stat. 1246 (1934); 12 U.S.C. 1422 et seq.98 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
Treasury guarantee of the principal and interest of the debentures
issued in payment of claims, and provision of a secondary market
for insured mortgages, first by The RFC Mortgage Company and
later by the Federal National Mortgage Association.4° The second
innovation was the mutual character of the insurance. Examination
fees and premiums were paid into the insurance fund (from which
claims and operating expenses were paid) by the mortgagors, who
shared in the ultimate proceeds, if any, of the particular accounts
into which their loans were placed.41 was the
substitution of long-term debentures (representing substantially
the amount of the claim) for a cash payment in case of foreclosure.
As originally conceived, the FHA was to be merely an adjunct
to the existing mortgage credit system, operated strictly on a pecu-
niary basis. While the credit under the plan was to be liberal,
with loan-to-value ratios up to 80 percent, low interest payments,
with amortization spread over twenty years for owner-borrowers
(on one- to four-family houses) and longer for rental housing, risk
was to be carefully measured and the terms of the loan patterned
in accordance. Moreover, the plan was expected to become fully
self-supporting as to payment of claims and operating expense out
of fees and insurance premiums, an end accomplished after the first
few years of operation.42
Once adopted and successfully operating, however, the insur-
ance idea opened possibilities of federal intervention far beyond
original contemplations. The first step in this process was taken in
1938 when, by insuring up to 90 percent the twenty-five-year mort-
gage loans on newly constructed houses valued at $6,000 or less,
the insurance device was used as a means for directing credit. into
a specialized sector of the total market. The further uses to which
40 An institution organized in 1938 under Title Ill of the National Housing Act,
with capital furnished by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 48 Stat. 1246
(1934); reconstituted by 62 Stat. 1206 (1948); 12 U.S.C. 1716 et seq., familiarly referred
to as May," from the initials FNMA.
41 The first payment on these accounts was made in 1944. See the Eleventh Annual
Report of the Federal Housing Administration, p. 8.
42 Although some income from fees and premiums had been used to pay operating
expense prior to mid-1939, at that time all appropriations from public funds for that
purpose ceased. Because of economic conditions prevailing during the period covered,
claims, of course, have been light. The combined capital and operating reserves of
all insurance accounts by the end of 1948 amounted to $200,369,176 (Fifteenth An-
nual Report of the Federal Housing Administration, p. 19).EXPANSION OF FEDERAL INFLUENCE .99
theidea has been put, and the changes in the original businessi
approach involved, will be reviewed in the following chapters.. )
SECONDARYIMPACTS OF THE DEPRESSION
Without doubt, the measures described above contributed to the
moderation and reversal of the deflationary movement and also
greatly augmented the sources of real estate credit. The latter was
accomplished not only through the new lending agencies but also
through the expansion of realty lending by existing institutions,
particularly commercial banks and mortgage companies, as a result
of FHA operations.43
Federal intervention, however, did not cease at this point. Two
situations of profound significance had developed. First, through
the HOLC, the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, and the
numerous measures for direct relief,
of emer-.
geiicy—a term, as later discovered, capable of a wide range of
definition. Second, the pereiice.qf brought to the.
fore social and economic inequities
Qi li&priyate
capable of iyielding to federal action. Since the best avenue of
federal intervention lay in the monetary power in the Constitution,
as broadly interpreted in the land bank decision, the forthcoming
devices for coping with these situations were mainly financial in
character. Unlike the facilities provided through the land banks,
the home loan banks, and the FHA, which were broadly available
to all applicants without distinction except as to their credit stand-
ing, the new approach concerned itself with special groups whose
resources were so inadequate as to mark them for special aid and
benefit. Of note are the operations of the Farm Security Adminis-
tration, which brought aid to special groups of farmers and rural
48Mortgagecompanies, in particular, were assisted by the FHA program in in-
creasing their market for selling mortgages, since FHA processing and regulations
resulted in a relatively standardized transaction with security appraised as well as
guaranteed by a disinterested governmental agency. These companies, which are
generally not supervised by state or federal regulatory agencies. use a comparatively
small fund of capital and borrowings for originating mortgage loans to be sold to
long-term investors. These institutions found the market for their mortgages ex-
panded from a local to' a national scale when the purchasers could rely on the FHA
guarantee rather than on their own investigations.100 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
workers, and the United States Housing Authority, which had for
its province special groups of urban tenants.
The Farm Security Administration grew out of the Emergency
Relief Appropriations Act of 1935which, among other things,
provided for "rural rehabilitation and relief in stricken agricul-
tural areas" and included loans "to finance, in whole or in part,
the purchase of farm lands and necessary equipment by farmers,.
farm tenants, croppers, or farm laborers." After a number of
changes in policy and name, the FSA was established in the Depart-
ment of Agriculture to carry out these functions as defined in the
Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of and as provided for
in subsequent relief appropriation acts. Under the tenant purchase
program, loans are made at 3.5 percent interest for forty years—
terms much more liberal than are available in the private lending
market; and in some cases payments for interest and principal may
be mainly on the basis of a percentage of products sold.
Like the FSA, the USHA was an outgrowth of emergency meas-
ures taken early in the depression. RFC loans to limited dividend
housing companies engaged in providing "low-rental" housing
were provided for in the Emergency Relief and Construction Act
of 1932.46 Later this power was transferred to the newly formed
Public Works Administration, where, due to a lack of borrowers
who could meet the requirements of that agency, the loan facilities
weredroppedin favor of direct building operations. Under this
plan, 45 percent of the investment was written off as an outright
grant with the remainder to be recaptured from the rental income
of the property over sixty years at 3 percent interest, title remaining
in the federal government.47 In this way "public housing," as it
came to be known, was born; and at once pressure developed for a
permanent and more generous means for providing new housing
for ii nderprivileged urban families.
In 1937, !Jnite&States Housing Act,48
4449 Stat. 115 (1935). See D. C. Horton, et al., op. cit., Chapter 9.
45 50 Stat. 522 (1937); 60 Stat. 1072 (1946); 7 U.S.C. 1000-1006.
46 47 Stat. 709 (1932); 39 U.S.C. 277; 48 Stat. 851 (1934); 5U.S.C.796.
47 The authority of the PWA to engage in housing operations came through the
National Recovery Act of 1953, 48 Stat. 200-201 (1933); 40 U.S.C. 8, 402. See Miles
L. Colean, American Housing (The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1944) pp.
48 50 Stat. 888 (1937); 42 U.S.C. 1401 et seq. See Charles Abrams, The Future of
Housing (New York, 1946) Chapter 20, for a complete description of the USHA and
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this in a new agency, the United States Hous-
ing Authority, subject to the general supervision of the Secretary
of the Interior. ow opera-
tionpublic housing properties were to be uii:thj ction of
specially constituted local The USHA was
empowered to make loans to these authorities representing 90 per-
cent of the cost and to pay annual subsidies which in effect might
meet, or more than meet, the carrying charges on the loans. The
municipalities were required to contribute annual amounts equiva-
lent to 20 percent cf the federal payments. Local contributions
might be, and usually were, in the form of property tax abatements
rather than of cash outlays.
As the plan developed, it was discovered that loans and annual
payments from the federal government often provided a sufficient
guarantee to permit local authorities to finance their housing proj-
ects by offering their own bonds at rates lower than those at which
the federal government could borrow. This condition was made
possible by the fact that local authority bonds were exempt from
federal income taxes and resulted in a further federal subsidy in
lost tax receipts. The initial legislation in 1937 authorized $800
million in loans and a maximum of $28 million a year in annual
subsidies to finance these local public housing projects. The bulk
of this had been contracted for at the outbreak of World War II.
Through these several means, the federal government discov-
ered that credit could be used not only to better the living condi-
tions of selected groups but also to accomplish social objectives not
directly related to a financial transaction. A few examples will
suffice for illustration. In connection with the farm loan agencies,
it was found that credit might serve as a tool for broad agricultural
policy. The subsidized urban housing program was used as a
means of applyir.g certain federal labor policies in strictly local
The insurance program provided a means
of ranges, and of imposing fed-
erally-prescribed standards for lap Lplaimiiig, construction, and
design upon the users of the system.
49Excepton government construction contracts, payment of prevailing wages,
application of wage-hour laws, barring of "kick-backs," prohibition of racial discrim-
ination, etc., all were beyond the reach of the federal government because no inter-
state commerce factor was present. See C. Abrams, cit., p. 273.102 IMPACTOF GOVERNMENT
IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II
In 1940 economic conditions had improved sufficiently to dull the
demand for further intervention and a trend toward withdrawal of
the federal government's influence in realty finance was evident.
And also in 1940, the Federal Land Bank System, with the govern-
ment stock retired from the majority of the banks, gave indica-
tions of soon being self-sufficient. The Federal Home Loan Bank
System at least held the hope of doing the same. The FHA was
operating without further direct appropriations and showed a
strong likelihood of continuing to be a self-sustaining institution.
The Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation and the HOLC were
being liquidated. The FSA was operating in a very restricted field.
The USHA had practically reached its initial limits, and Congress
had refused its insistent requests for an additional authorization.
The upsurge of war preparations early in 1941, followed by the
concentration on war production late that year, violently reversed
this trend. It was soon concluded that lending operations based on
customary risk considerations would not supply the credits neces-
sary for the industrial expansion and housing that were
required to meet the demands of war. In many cases, manufactur-
ing plants were built directly with government funds. In other
cases, liberal credit was provided by a new RFC subsidiary, the
Defense Plants Corporation.5° While private institutions were not
absent from the program, the bulk of the load was carried, one way
or another, through federal activity. Government funds were ap-
propriated (following the precedent of World War I) for temporary
and permanent housing needed to shelter war workers.5' Federal
funds were also made available for "community facilities"—roads,
sewers, water extensions, nursery schools, shopping centers, and the
like.52 In addition, a new part (Title VI) was added to the National
Housing Act. This created a nonmutual insurance system (from
which the concept of "economic soundness" was omitted) and pro-
vided a special fund for the purpose of insuring 90 percent mort-
50 Created August 22, 1940, under § Sd of the RFC Act, 15 U.S.C., § 606b.
51 These powers for the most part were conferred by the Lanham Acts, 54 Stat.
1125 (1940); 42 U.S.C. 1521.
52 The Second Lanham Act, 55 Stat. 861 (1941); 42 U.S.C. 1521, 1528.EXPANSION OF FEDERAL INFLUENCE 103
gage loans on housing for war workers when the loans were made
either to builders or home buyers by private lending institutions.
Most of the privately built wartime housing was financed in this
way.58
A year later, construction not directly related to the war ef-
fort was drastically curtailed through exercise of the war powers
delegated to the War Production Board.54 The field of mortgage
credit operations was greatly narrowed and numerous imbalances
were created. The sharp competition for loans that developed
within the restricted market, as well as the forced buying of houses,
as units were shifted from the controlled rental market to a free
sales market, set loose unforeseen inflationary forces.
In 1942 the housing agencies of the government—the
Federal Home Board, the Fl-IA, the USI-IA (with name
changed to Federal Public Housing Authority), and various war-
born housing activities—were combined by executive order into a
Agency.55 To this new superagency was given a
novel function which, though limited to wartime, had far-reaching
future significance. This function was "programming," or deter-
mining the location, amount, price range, and proportion of rental
to sales accommodations of all new residential construction to be
undertaken, and the method—whether by public or private initia-
tive—under which the construction was to be done.
Another significant aspect of this consolidation was the subordi-
nation of the peacetime mortgage credit agencies to a general
supervision, for the purpose of accomplishing a specific social aim
—the housing of war workers. In this environment, the credit
system was simply an instrument, and its functioning was geared
58Amendmentsto the National Housing Act, March 28, 1941, 55 Stat. 55. For
individual houses for sale the maximum mortgage to which these provisions were
applicable was $4,000 raised in 1942 to $5,400. In 1942 the Act was amended to pro-
vide insurance for 90 percent mortgage on rental housing properties, with a maxi-
mum mortgage of $1,350 per room. 56 Stat. 301 (1942).
54Constructionof virtually all kinds was required to have WPB approval under
the terms of the famous conservation order "L-41," first issued April 9, 1942. Similar
action had been taken during World War I. See Bernard M. Baruch, American
Industry in War (New York, 1941).
55ExecutiveOrder 9070, February 24, 1942. Under this Order the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board was abolished and all its functions and those of related agencies
were transferred to a single commissioner. The name of the agency was changed to
the Federal Home Loan Bank Administration. This action has been reversed and
the Board restored. See Chapter 8, footnote 9.104 IMPACTOF GOVERNMENT
to the advancement of the main purpose, irrespective of other con-
siderations. There were also changes of viewpoint in regard to the
operation of the agencies themselves. Thus in the new wartime
amendments to the National Housing Act, the requirement for
"economic soundness" was purposely dropped; and the making of
insured loans was based entirely on immediate needs and current
costs with little or no concern with the future.
By the time the war ended the following conditions prevailed:
(1) Practically all new nonresidential construction not related to
military requirements or war production was prohibited by the
War Production Board.
(2) Only residential construction conforming to the program of the
National Housing Agency could be undertaken, though vet-
erans, building for themselves, were given a blanket exemption.
(3) Residential rents were under the control of the Office of Price
Administration,56 except in the District of Columbia which had
its separate rent control agency.
(4) The supply of rental housing was continually being reduced by
removal of units from the controlled rental market to the uncon-
trolled sales market.
-(5)Building materials, along with other commodities, were subject
to price control. Efforts to control the prices of "construction
services" had, however, proved unworkable.
(6) The supply of building materials was very short, and no steps
had been taken by the government to permit a restoration of
production to meet postwar demands.
•(7) With the drastic curtailment of new construction, the field of
real estate mortgage lending had been largely restricted to the
refinancing of existing properties.
(8) Housing demand was already rising rapidly as both the marriage
and birth rates increased. Higher incomes and savings from war
activities and the special home financing terms given to World
War II veterans combined to support an unprecedented total
demand for housing.
56Inall "defense rental areas," as designated by the OPA Administrator. The
towns and cities thus covered comprised the greater part of the nonfarm population.
Neither during nor after World War I did Congress enact a rent control measure,
except for the District of Columbia. A few states enacted rent control measures during
the immediate postwar period. The New York rent control law remained in effect
until June 1929. See Edith Berger Drellick and André Emery, Rent Control in War
and Peace (New York, 1939).EXPANSION OF FEDERAL INFLUENCE 105
The beginning of the war found large sectors of realty finance
subject to government control or influence; at its conclusion both
had been vastly expanded. The extension of federal intervention
during the thirties made further extension easier during the war.
The suggestion of withdrawal evident in 1940 was lost amid the
demands of this greatest in a long series of emergencies.